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IN THE SUPRE11E COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH 





Case No. 18126 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
STATEMENT OF THE NATURE OF THE CASE 
This is an appeal from a conviction of Criminal Homicide, 
Murder in the Second Degree, a First Degree Felony, in violation 
of Utah Co_de Ann. §-76-5-203(a) (b) (c) (1953 as amended) in the 
Third Judicial District Court in and for Salt Lake County, 
State of Utah, the Honorable Peter F. Leary, Judge presiding. 
DISPOSITION IN THE LOWER COURT 
The appellant, Thomas Garcia, was charged by Information 
with the offense of Criminal Homicide, Murder in the Second 
Degree, a First Degree Felony, in violation of Utah Code Ann. 
§76-5-203(a) (b) (c) (1953 as amended). On October 28, 1981 
the appellant was convicted by a jury of the offense charged 
in the Information. On November 9, 1981 the appellant was 
sentenced by the above entitled court, the Honorable Peter 
F. Leary, Judge presiding, to five years to life at the Utah 
State Prison. 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL 
The appellant, Thomas Garcia, seeks reversal of the 
judgment of guilt entered against him and a remand of the instant 
case to the trial court for new trial. 
STATE}IBNT OF THE FACTS 
At trial, the evidence showed that in the early morning 
hours of March 15, 1981, Officer Ryan Nielsen was returning 
home from the University of Utah, where he is a police officer. 
His attention was directed to a parked vehicle and three people 
near the East High School parking lot on Sunnyside Avenue in 
Salt Lake City. In particular he noticed one of the individuals, 
the appellant, was not wearing a shirt. Officer Nielsen drove 
past the vehicle, made a U-turn, and drove by again. He again 
saw the appellant, making eye-contact as he observed the appellant 
pulling a body out of the vehicle. (T.6) The appellant appeared 
to have blood on his person. 
Officer Nielsen then drove west to a nearby Seven-Eleven 
Store, to surmnon help. The clerk there had earlier seen the 
vehicle driving east on Eighth South (Sunnyside), apparently 
having engine trouble. While in the parking lot he saw the 
vehicle in question proceed west on Eighth South Street, he 
pursued it some eight blocks, when the three individuals seen 
earlier exited the vehicle. 
Officer Nielsen exited his vehicle. He observed the 
three individuals and immediately felt they were impaired by 
drugs and/or alcohol. He ordered them to freeze and lie on 
the ground. Two of the individuals (Mary Holloway and Charles 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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Crick) did so. The appellant lied down, but then ran and was 
tackled by Officer Nielsen. The officer and the appellant 
wrestled on the ground (T. 13) during which time the appellant 
allegedly threatened both the officer and a passerby whom the 
officer had requested to call the police (T. 15). The other 
two individuals in the vehicle left the scene. The appellant 
was very agitated and wanted to fight. 
The victim had been dead for sometime before his body 
had been dumped at the East High parking lot. Rigor mortis 
had begun to set in, and the body was cold when paramedics 
arrived. Very little blood was present. (T. 39) The cause 
of death was fifteen stab wounds (T. 65). In addition, the 
body had ben beaten in the head with a blunt object, and showed 
bruises on the hand consistent with very recent fighting. Several 
drugs, including phenobarbital, methadone, dalmene, diazepan, 
and nordiazipan, were found in the blood, in therapuetically 
substantial quantities, as well as an alcohol content of .19% 
(T. 69). 
The scene of the homicide was found to be an apartment 
where Mary Holloway and Charles Crick resided (T. 82). The 
victim had been staying there temporarily. Blood matching 
the types of both the appellant and the victim, was found on 
walls and a mattress. The blood was diluted by attempts by 
Holloway and Crick to wash it away (T. 97). A knife, probably 
the murder weapon, had been found near the body at the East 
High parking lot. 
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Diana Poor testified that she had visited the appellant 
in jail in mid May of 1981. There, the appellant stated he 
had fought with the victim when the victim mistreated a puppy. 
He stated that he threw punches only. Crick and Holloway then 
joined in, beating the victim with a mug and numchucks (T 118). 
The appellant denied stabbing anyone. He also indicated no 
one cared for him, and that he had no one, while Crick and 
Holloway had each other and a future. Therefore, Crick, Holloway 
and the appellant agreed that appellant would take the blame 
for the homicide. (T. 123) 
On a second jail visit some two months later, appellant 
asked Ms. Poor if she knew where his knife was, as he was afraid 
someone might have taken it. (T. 121) 
Crick and Holloway were tried separately and convicted 
of Second Degree Murder. Both were called by the State~ but in 
effect but did not testify. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
ERROR TO ADMIT HEARSAY AS TO APPELLANT'S ALLEGED 
THREATS AFTER HIS ARREST. 
Te~timony was received, over appellant's objection, which was 
~ustained,that while appellant was wrestling with Officer Ryan 
he threatened a bystander, whom the officer had requested to 
summon the police, by stating: 
"I wil 1 k il 1 you." (T. 15) 
The statement was clearly hearsay, inadmissible under 
Rule 63, Utah Rules of Evidence. Moreover, the eliciting of 
such testimony painted appellant as an evil, violent person, 
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likely or predisposed to commit murder, so that the introduction 
of such evidence violated Rules 45, 47 and 55 of the Utah Rules 
of Evidence. 
Rule 45 states: 
. . . the judge may in his discretion exclude evidence 
if he finds its probative value is substantially 
outweighed by the risk that its admission will 
. . . (b) create substantial danger of undue prejudice 
or of confusing the jury, ... 
Rule 45, Utah Rules of Evidence 
The alleged threats made during appellant's arrest were 
irrelevant to the case. Even if one assumes some minimal relevance, 
the overwhelming danger of undue prejudice required excluding 
such evidence. The purpose of introducing such evidence was 
to paint appellant as an evil, quarrelsome person; one who 
would easily resort to deadly force, because he would easily 
resort to verbal threats. 
Such evidence misled the jury to the conclusion that 
appellant was a man of violent character. Under Rule 45 the 
trial court's failure to exclude such evidence was an abuse 
of discretion and reversible error. 
The admission of such evidence also violated Rule 47, 
which sets the standard for admission of character evidence, 
when relevant, pursuant to Rule 46, except 
. . . that (a) evidence of specific instances of 
conduct other than evidence of conviction of a 
crime which tends to prove the conduct had shall 
be inadmissible, and (b) in a criminal action evidence 
of an accused's character ... (ii) if offered 
by the prosecution to prove his guilt, may be admitted 
only after the accus-ed has introduced evidence 
of his good character. 
Rule 47, Emphasis supplied. 
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The admission of the evidence violated Rule 47 in two 
respects. A specific instance of bad conduct was admitted, 
and it was not a conviction of a crime. Further, appellant 
never offered evidence of his good character. 
Rule 55 was violated as well. That rule states: 
Subject to Rule 47 evidence that a person committed 
a crime or civil wrong on a specified occasion, 
is inadmissible to prove his disposition to conunit 
crime or civil wrong as the basis for an inference 
that he committed another crime or civil wrong 
on another specified occasion but, subejct to Rule 
•
1 45 and 48 such evidence is admissible when relevant 
to prove some other material fact including absence 
of mistake or accident, motive, opportunity, intent, 
preparation, plan, knowledge or identity. Rule 
55, Utah Rules of Evidence. 
By its own terms, Rule 55 is subject to Rules 45 and 
47. Even if one assumes, arguendo, that the evidence did not 
violate Rules 45 and 47, it was nevertheless not relevant to 
prove any material fact of the instant homicide. The evidence 
was irrelevant to motive, intent , preparation, accident, mistake, 
knowledge, or identity. Nor was it relevant to impeaching 
appellant's testimony (see State v. Goodliffe, 578 P.2d 1288 
(Utah 1978) disucssed infra.) 
In State v. Goodliffe, supr~ iefendant had been convicted 
of forcible sexual abuse of a six year old girl. After the 
State had rested, two of defendant's co-workers testified in 
his behalf as to his reputation for truth and veracity. Defendant 
testified in his own behalf. In rebuttal the State presented 
evidence of three similar sexual abuse incidents, allegedly 
perpetrated by defendant. The Supreme Court of Utah reversed 
defendant's conviction. 
-h-
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"The rules of evidence require rejection of evidence 
of specific behavior to prove a character trait 
except conviction of a crime .... 
[The record reveals that the trial court admitted 
the evidence for the purpose of rebutting defendant's 
evidence of his truthfulness and veracity]; yet 
the clear implication of the testimony was that 
it was an attempt to demonstrate defendant's propensity 
to commit sexual crimes of the nature he is presently 
charged with. . . . 
The admission of such evidence without further 
explanation could only have caused the jury to 
speculate about defendant's propensity to commit 
such crimes and confuse the issues, all to the 
prejudice of defendant, which necessitates a new 
trial." 
(578 P.2d at 1290, original- emphasis) 
In the instant case, the introduction of the alleged 
threats was similarly an attempt to show that appellant had 
a propensity for violent criminal acts, and was prejudicial 
to him. As the Court stated in State v. Green 578 P.2d 512 
(Utah 1978) 
" ... in the interest of justice the defendant 
is entitled to be tried on the charge against him, 
and without having any prejudice aroused by attempting 
to disgrace him, or show a disposition to connnit 
crime." (578 P.2d at 513-514) 
The effect of such evidence as was here introduced was 
to inflame and prejudice the jury and to deny appellant a fair 
trial. 
In State v. Dickson, 12 Utah (2d 8, 361 P.2d 412 (1961), 
the Court reversed defendant's conviction of robbery. The 
Court indicated that allowing cross-examination of defendant 
as to details of a prior felony conviction was reversible error, 
but apparently based its reversal on a "matter of graver importance." 
During cross-examination of defendant, the prosecutor was allowed 
to elicit testimony of a "disturbance" in Texas, where defendant Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
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had been shot, and later charged, but not tried, on the offense 
of being an accessory to a robbery. The Court found the Texas 
incident to be irrelevant to modus operandi. 
" ... the Texas incident would have no legitimate 
probative value as to defendant's complicity in 
the robbery charged here. It's only effect would 
be to cast aspersions upon the defendant and to 
imply that because he was involved in the Texas 
trouble he is a person of evil character who would 
be likely to commit such a crime as here charged. 
The very purpose of excluding such evidence is 
to prevent the prosecution from smearing an accused 
by showing a bad reputation and relying on that -
for a conviction, rather than being required to 
produce adequate proof of the crime in question." 
(361 P.2d at 412) 
State v. Kazda, 14 Utah (2d) 266, 382 P.2d 407 (1963) 
is in accord. 
In the case at bar the pro_secution has resor:ted to smearing 
appellant with evidence of an isolated incident, taken out 
of context, in order to gain a conviction. 
State v. Putzell, 40 Wash. 2d 174, 242 P.2d 180 (1952) 
is of interest, there defendant was convicted of first degree 
murder. Defendant, in addition to pleading not guilty, entered 
a plea of insanity or mental irresponsibility. The evidence 
showed that defendant entered a tavern, approached deceased 
and fired several shots, one of which hit deceased. Deceased 
then ran outside, got in a cab, and stated he wanted to go 
to the hospital. Defendant followed deceased to the cab, and 
pulled deceased, as he lie on his back. A police officer arrived 
and disarmed defendant. Defendant stated to the officer: 
"Leave me alone. I have been after this guy for 
a long time and I'm going to get him." 
(242 P.2d at 182) 
-8-
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At the trial, defendant testified in his own behalf. 
He stated that some two years before the homicide, deceased 
had assaulted him without provocation, and that deceased had 
struck him on the head with a fire hose nozzle. Defendant 
stated that as a result of this assault, he was unconscious 
for a period of some thirteen hours; that surgery was required, 
~n which pieces of skull were removed; that he had become extremely 
nervous and unable to sleep; that he suffered blackouts, fear 
of busses and planes; and that his head felt as though ants 
were crawling in it and an iron band was exerting pressure 
on it. 
During cross-examination of defendant, he denied that 
he had car~ied a gun on the night of the· assault two years 
before the homicide. The state rebutted over defendant's objection 
with two witnesses who testified that while defendant had been 
unconscious, they had removed a pistol and knife from his pocket. 
The trial court held that the evidence was proper rebuttal 
to defendant's testimony that he was a peaceful, lawabiding 
citizen, and that it was not impeaching on a collateral matter. 
The Supreme Court of Washington reversed. The court 
noted that defendant did not deny the shooting, and that his 
main defense was lack of mental responsibility, caused by deceased's 
previous aggressive attack. The court recognized that it was 
proper for the state to show that defendant, not the deceased, 
had been the aggressor, but that the evidence which the State 
had presented on that issue was not probative of it. 
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" . . . such testimony was not relevant or material 
as to the- issue of whether or not appellant was 
the aggressor, and tended to invite the jury to 
guess, speculate and conjecture." 
(242 P.2d at 185) 
As to whether the evidence was proper rebuttal to defendant's 
testimony of his law abiding nature, the court noted that it 
was defendant who had raised the issu~ initially (unlike the 
instant case), but held nevertheless that the state could not 
rebut defendant's testimony by showing specific acts of misconduct, 
stating: 
"'No rule permits the general character of the 
defendant, even when directly put in issue, to 
be impeached by showing the commission by him of 
a specific crime, other than the one for which 
he is on trial."' (242 P.2d at 18~) 
A fortiori, when the character of a defendant is not 
in issue, it is improper to attempt to show his bad character 
by specific acts. 
The court in Putzell, supra also held the matter to 
be collateral and therefore inadmissible to impeach defendant's 
testimony, whereas in the instant case, appellant did not testify. 
stated: 
Finally, (and perhaps most significantly), the court 
"Conceding, for the sake of argument, that the 
rebuttal testimony in question might have been 
material, still it should not have been admitted 
because its inflammatory nature so far outweighed 
any materiality it might have had as to be prejudicial. 
Here was a man being tried on a charge of first 
degree murder. His defense was that he was mentally 
irresponsible as the result of a prior unprovoked 
assault on him by the deceased, and in which occurrence 
he was not the aggressor. The state, to rebut 
that contention, introduced evidence of finding 
a gun and a knife in his pocket. The purpose of 
that testimony was to portray him as a vicious, 
-10-
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quarrelsome man. The very inflammatory nature 
of this testimony leaves no margin for speculation 
as to whether or not the jury was swayed by it." 
(242 P.2d at 186) 
In the case at bar, the testimony as to the alleged 
threats, elicted on direct examination was also for the purpose 
of showing appellant to be vicious and quarrelsome. It was 
neither relevant nor material. Note: The trial court here 
sustained an objection to this evidence (T. 15), but nevertheless 
the evidence was before the jury. The evidence was clearly 
inflammatory and prejudicial, and should have been excluded. 
Since it was not, appellant was denied a fair trial, and is 
entitled to a new one. 
POINT II 
ERROR TO ADMIT INFLAMI'.'1ATORY PHOTOGRAPHS OF THE VICTIM'S 
BODY. 
Numerous color photographs of the victim's body were 
admitted into evidence over the objection of appellant. 
In State v. Poe, 21 Utah (2d) 113, 441 P.2d 512 (1968), 
24 Utah (2d) 355, 471 P.2d 870 (1970) the Court held the introduction 
into evidence of color autopsy slides to be an abuse of discretion. 
The introduction of photos of the scene of the crime was held 
to be proper, where such photos were probative of several issues, 
including defendant's presence at the scene, and the mental 
element of a depraved mind. In reversing, the Court noted: 
"All the material facts which could conceivably 
have been adduced from a viewing of the slides 
had been established by uncontradicted lay and 
medical testimony. The only purpose served was 
to inflame and arouse the jury." 
(441 P.2d at 515) 
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In the instant case, the photos has no probative value. 
The identity of the deceased was known. The cause of death 
was established by medical testimony. The photos were probative 
of no element of criminal homicide that was not provable by 
other competent evidence. The photos were not of the scene 
of the crime, but rather where the body was found. Admitting 
the photos served only to arouse and inf lame the passions of 
the jury. 
The Supreme Court of Pennsylvania espoused a rule similar 
to Poe, supra, in Commonwealth v. Scaramuzzio, 317 A.2d 225 
(Pa. 1974): 
"At the outset it should be noted that the practice 
of admitting photographs of the body of the deceased, 
unless they have essential evidentiary value, is 
condemned." (217 A.2d at 226, emphasis supplied) 
" . . . they should not be resorted to where the witness can 
clearly convey the facts to the jury without their 
use. These slides were simply cummulative to the 
pathologists' testimony as to the position, number, 
and severity of the wounds." 
(317 A.2d at 227) 
The photos in the instant case were similarly cummulative 
to the testimony of the police officers and the State Medical 
Examiner. 
The case of State v. Wells, 603 P.2d 810 (1979), is 
of interest. In that case, as here, the cause of death was 
not disputed, and established by medical testimony. This court 
stated: 
We do not condone the admission of the photographs 
in this case, since we are able to find no evidentiary 
vlaue for the photographs other than the hoped-
f or emotional impact on the jurv. 
(603 P.2d at 813, emphasis supplied) 
-12-
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In Wells, supra, while the court found error, it held 
the error to be not prejudicial, because the photographs were 
neither gruesome or offensive. In the case at bar, the photographs 
were both gruesome and offensive, 
"such that there exists a reasonable probability 
or likelihood that there would have been a result 
more favorable to the defendant in absence of the 
error." (603 P.2d at 813) 
The photos here were hardly of "essential evidentiary 
value." Indeed they were of no probative value whatsoever, 
and went to not relevant or material issue which could not 
be established by testimony. Their only effect was to inflame 
and prejudice the jury by the showing of a gruesome scene. 
In such a case as here, where the evidence against appellant 
is so minimal, they should have been excluded. Their admission 
denied appellant a fair trial. 
POINT III 
THE JURY'S VERDICT WAS UNSUPPORTED BY THE EVIDENCE. 
The evidence adduced at trial is set out supra in the 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS. In fact, no evidence exists linking 
appellant to the murder of the victim, except that he was seen 
pulling the victim's body from a vehicle, some time after the 
death, and he admitted fighting with fists only, with the victim. 
While there was blood on appellant's person after moving the 
body, no one looked for blood on Crick and Holloway, who were 
also convicted of the murder in question. No evidence of a 
conspiracy to commit murder exists. 
-13-
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Clearly, the burden is on the State to prove the identity 
of the murder. State v. Green, 229 P.2d 318 (Wash. 1951). While 
an inference of guilt may be drawn from concealing the victim's 
body, that inference is "by no means strong enough of itself", 
to warrant conviction. Cagle v. State, 507 S.W. 2d 121, 129 
(Tenn. Cr. App. 1973). 
Cagle, supra, is closely on point. There, the court 
held the record supported the jury's verdict. In addition 
to evidence of the defendant's concealing the victim's body, 
there was evidence of numerous inconsistent statements as to 
the defendant's secreting himself in the victim's home, his 
whereabouts when the murder occurred, his activities on the 
days in question, his ~esigns to have sexual relations with 
the victim, and whether in fact he had sexual relations with 
her. 
In addition, he named as a "fellow employee" a man for 
whom he was searching on the day in question, when in fact 
no such person seemed to exist. He stated he had been at a 
hospital emergency room for treatment, yet no such record existed, 
and no one employed in the emergency room ever saw him. When 
questioned by police, he inquired whether the victim's body 
being found outside of the county would clear him. (This was 
before the body had been found and the police knew the victim 
was dead). 
The body was found in a quarry with strips of cloth 
around the neck. The victim had suffered blows to the head, 
but the cause of death was strangulation. It was impossible 
to determine whether there had been a sexual as~,q11lr_ 
-14-
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The victim had bleached hair. Bleached hair was found 
in defendant's car. 
At the time of defendant's arrest, he asked if the body 
had been found. 
While in jail, defendant had several times denied (to 
other inmates) that he had killed the victim. Reading newspaper 
accounts of the incident would enrage him. After reading such 
an account defendant stated, "yeah, I killed the damned bitch." 
He then went on to explain how he intended to bury the body, 
but abandoned that plan when he throught he heard someone else 
in the quarry. He then inquired of his fellow inmates whether 
the material around the victim's neck would yield fingerprints 
after "so long". Additionally, he stated he had not had sex 
with the victim, and then said he had. 
In the case at bar, however, there is the fact that 
appellant pulled the body of the victim from a car, and his 
statement that he had a fist fight with him earlier. There 
was also appellant's statement that following the fist fight, 
Crick and Holloway set upon the victim. The victim's blood 
was found at Crick and Holloway's apartment, after Crick and 
Holloway tried to wash it away. Blood was also found there 
matching the appellant's. (No blood tests were ever run on 
Crick and Holloway). (T.100) The condition of the victim's 
fists was consistent with a recent fist fight. Appellant had 
asked, months after the homicide, whether his knife was still 
in his effects, fearing that someone may have removed it. 
This evidence simply does not rise to the level of proof 
beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant committed murder. 
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Indeed, it indicates that the prejudicial impact of the erroneously 
admitted photographs and alleged threats resulted in appellant's 
conviction, and therefore said conviction must be reversed. 
CONCLUSION 
Appellant's conviction was the result of the inflamed 
passion and prejudice of the jury. The enumerated errors in 
Points I and II not only served separately to deny appellant 
a fair trial, but they also worked in a cummulative fashion, 
to the prejudice of appellant. 
Because appellant was convicted on the basis of a bad 
and evil character; and because of inflamed passions, and because 
the State also failed to prove his guilt beyond a reasoanble 
doubt, his conviction. must be reversed. 
DATED this ~ \ day of June, 1982. 
for Appellant 
DELIVERED a copy o foregoing to the Attorney General's 
Office, 236 State Capitol Building, Salt Lake City, Utah, this 
;l \ day of June, 1982. 
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